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“These two examples, it’s important to note, reveal an important and often overlooked truth 
about the top PE firms: Their investment theses tend to focus not on cost reduction but on 
growth. Yes, imposing a stronger strategic focus usually entails aggressive pruning of the 
existing business, but creating a path to strong growth is what produces the big returns on 
investment. Far from stripping assets to boost short-term returns, PE firms actually tend to 
overinvest in businesses during the first six months of their ownership. Whether a firm’s 
planned exit is a sale or an IPO, netting top dollar demands a compelling growth story.”  
– Rogers, Holland and Haas (Harvard Business Review, 2002) 
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1 Introduction  
Private equity (PE) industry has grown remarkably since mid-1990s. Instead of looking for 
synergies in a potential target company, a private equity company, or any other financial 
acquirer, seeks for inefficiencies that they can fix, so that they can later exit with a profit. Top 
financial acquirers pay smaller premium and make bigger profit than strategic acquirers. In 
contrast to strategic buyers, financial acquirers look for different, often less appealing qualities 
in target companies. Their objective is clear, to acquire an unattractive company for a low price, 
make it attractive, and sell it for a profit. 
Financial community has provided little research on causes of differences in premiums 
paid by different types of acquirers. Bargeron et al. (2008) studied why private companies pay 
smaller premium in mergers and acquisitions than public companies. They found that there 
were target and deal characteristics that made the target company to be more likely bought by 
private equity company than an operating company, but they could not fully explain differences 
in premiums paid. Nevertheless, they showed many assumptions of private equity behavior to 
hold true. 
However, Bargeron et al. did not study much the targets’ industry effects. Therefore, it 
is of interest to study how target company’s industry characteristics would affect premiums 
paid, and whether those characteristics would have explanatory power in the question why do 
financial acquirers pay less than strategic ones do.  
This paper studies what target company’s industry-level characteristics can tell about 
the differences in premiums paid by strategic and financial acquirers. I start with comparing 
premiums paid, industry characteristics’ attractiveness to the two acquirer types, and then 
continue to investigate whether the industry characteristics have an impact on the differences 
in premiums paid. I will use terms financial investor, financial acquirer and financial buyer 
interchangeably throughout this paper as well as strategic buyer and strategic acquirer. I define 
premium to be the market reaction on target company’s share price before and after the 
acquisition announcement. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical background 
and review of previous studies on the topic. In addition, I define my hypotheses at the end of 
Section 2. Section 3 describes the data I used for my research. Section 4 presents methodology 
and results for the statistical tests. Section 5 deals with robustness checks, and finally, Section 
6 concludes and discusses the results and implications as well as gives suggestions for further 
research. 
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2 Theoretical background and hypotheses  
2.1 Theory and previous researches  
Traditionally, the reason behind mergers and acquisitions has been that the companies involved 
seek benefits they could not achieve without combining businesses. These benefits, called 
synergies, are the excess net income that the combined company gets in addition to their stand-
alone incomes. The synergies are based on strategic or operational benefits the combined 
company gets. I define such acquisitions in this paper as strategic acquisitions. In contrast, 
acquisitions, where the acquirer does not seek operational or strategic synergies, but an 
opportunity to make improvements in the target company, after which they can implement an 
exit strategy1, are defined as financial acquisitions.  
In theory, acquirer should pay for the target company something between the target 
company’s stand-alone value and target company’s stand-alone value plus the present value of 
synergies. The amount paid excess to target’s stand-alone value is called premium. On the other 
hand, the target company should maximize their profit; hence require the largest amount of 
premium to be gained from selling the business. Therefore, strategic buyer should pay premium 
approximately the amount of synergies they gain. Because financial acquirers are not looking 
for operational synergies, one can argue that the target management cannot expect them to pay 
as high premiums as strategic buyers do. Moreover, Bargeron et al. (2008) show in their study 
that private equity companies pay significantly lower premiums than operating companies do. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) discuss also other possible reasons why private equity companies 
pay less premium than the strategic buyers. 
Based on DePamphilis (2015), financial acquirers can make profit in several ways. 
Acquirer can see potential for cost reduction or improvements in other operational and financial 
inefficiencies. There can even be a possibility to sell non-profitable operations of the company 
to make it more attractive when the time for exit becomes relevant. Moreover, financial 
acquisitions quite often include large amounts of debt. These types of acquisitions are called 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs). Here the acquirer finances the acquisition with as much debt as 
possible. Because the required return for debt is lower than the required return for equity, it 
makes sense to raise cheap capital with leverage. Financial acquirer tackles the default risk 
associated with a high leverage by selecting a target company with a steady income. That way 
                                                 
1 An exit strategy is a financial acquirers’ plan to realize their earnings from the takeover. Most often this means 
selling the target company to new owners. 
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financial acquirer can use the cash flows generated by the target company, to pay the interest 
and pay back the debt. In addition, paying the interest creates tax shield that also provides 
economic benefits for the financial acquirer. When the debt level reaches a target level, 
financial owner can implement the exit strategy. The profit from selling company’s equity will 
also include the share of equity gained by paying back debt with company’s cash flows. 
Financial acquirers seek primarily opportunities, where a target company could be 
improved and later sold with a high profit. Based on DePamphilis (2015), target selection, 
avoiding overpaying and improving operating performance are among the most important 
factors for a successful LBO. DePamphilis describes an attractive industry for the LBO’s target 
company to be in a mature state. Such industries are characterized by large tangible book 
values, modest growth prospects, stable cash flows, and limited research and development 
(R&D) spending. In addition, empirical studies have shown that industries with high free cash 
flow and limited growth opportunities are good candidates for LBOs (Opler and Titman, 1993; 
Phan, 1995). This is consistent with the presumption that financial investors acquire companies 
with a steady cash flow, because companies’ cash flows are considered to be driven by industry-
level factors (Palepu et al., 2013). 
Harford and Kolasinski (2013) show that selling the target company to a strategic buyer 
is the most common way of exiting. The second most common way of exit is a sale to another 
financial acquirer in a so-called secondary buyout. Further, Harford and Kolasinski show that 
strategic buyers’ stock prices increase when they announce the purchase of a portfolio company 
from a private equity sponsor. They also reject the hypothesis, that private equity firms sacrifice 
long-term value for short-term profit. Indeed, several researches (Lerner et al., 2011; 
Lichtenberg & Siegel, 1990; Popov & Roosenboom, 2009) implicate that companies acquired 
by private equity companies tend to invest in innovation. This is related with improving the 
operating margin by improving efficiency and introducing new products (DePamphilis, 2015). 
Together with the target in a mature industry hypothesis, this suggests that financial acquirers 
seek to find a target that they can turn attractive for a strategic buyer, who is looking for a long-
term benefit in an otherwise stable and modest-growth industry. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses  
In this research paper, I will try to show that financial and strategic acquirers have different 
preferences in target company’s industry, and therefore it can partly explain why these two 
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different acquirer types pay different premiums. Next, I will introduce my hypotheses and 
explain the reasoning behind them.  
First, I need to test that the theory of financial acquirers paying less premium holds true 
with the empirical data. Therefore, my first hypothesis addresses this question:  
 
H1:  Financial acquirers pay smaller premium for a target company than strategic acquirers.  
 
My next hypotheses determine several target companies’ industry-level characteristics that 
should be different for different acquirers based on theory described by DePamphilis (2015): 
One of the primary ways of gaining profit in a financial acquisition is through leverage. 
Often exit strategy involves a target debt level which financial acquirer obtains from industry 
average debt ratio. This seems appropriate, because it would be reasonable to sell a company 
with an average debt-ratio to a strategic buyer, and strategic buyer would most likely also prefer 
a strategic acquisition of a company with an “optimal capital structure”2. Because there is a 
relatively large profit to gain and more tax shield to obtain from a large debt reduction, when 
financial acquirer uses leverage to buyout a target company, I expect financial acquirers to 
prefer a low debt ratio for industry.  
 
H2:  Financial acquirers look for companies within industries with a low average debt ratio, 
whereas it should not be as relevant for the strategic acquirers. 
 
Because many exit strategies often involve selling the target company to a strategic buyer, 
financial acquirers want to make the target companies attractive from a strategic perspective. 
It is reasonable to believe that strategic buyers in less innovative industries should be interested 
in acquisitions, where they can gain synergies from target’s innovations. Hence, it would be 
easier for a financial acquirer to sell an innovative company in a less innovative industry to 
gain a large profit. On the other hand, it would be logical for a strategic buyer to acquire 
innovative companies from innovative industries to obtain some cross-industry innovation-
                                                 
2 Optimal capital structure is one of the most discussed topics in the field of corporate finance. There are several 
theories that try to assess the optimal capital structure, but no single theory that could provide universal assessment 
for the optimal capital structure (Brealey et al. 2014). In practice, industry average debt ratio is often viewed as 
an optimal capital structure in lack of a better knowledge. There are also several empirical studies that show that 
individual companies’ debt ratios are strongly driven by the industry they operate in (MacKay & Phillips, 2005; 
Bradley et al., 1984; Schwartz & Aronson, 1967). 
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related synergies. Therefore, I expect financial acquirers to prefer industries with relatively low 
R&D spending. 
 
H3:  Strategic (Financial) buyers acquire companies in industries where the relative R&D 
activity is high (low). 
 
To tackle the risk that financial acquirers take, when they expect they can make the target 
company more attractive to a strategic buyer than it was, they should expect to have a steady 
income already with little or no improvements. Also, to pay back the debt that is often affiliated 
with a financial acquisition, financial acquirers are expected to seek companies that provide 
steady enough income to manage the debt reduction. Income is often industry-driven, and 
because some industries are more stable than others are, industry-level profitability should be 
important to a financial acquirer. For strategic acquirers, industry profitability should not matter 
as much, because they look more for strategic synergies they can gain jointly with the target 
company. 
 
H4: Financial acquirers’ target companies are in more profitable and profit-wise stable 
industries, whereas that should not be as relevant for strategic acquirers. 
 
Historically, firms have been attracted to make acquisitions in high growth industries 
(Audretsch, 1989). Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) also show that high industry growth rate is 
an important factor in high acquisition activity. Acquiring a company in a high growth industry 
makes sense to a strategic buyer who wants to expand and modernize their business for the 
current growth trend. Moreover, Schoenberg and Reeves suggest that managers may want to 
maximize their own utility by a rapid growth of the corporation they run, for which acquiring 
companies in high growth industries would be very a suitable method. From the financial 
acquirer’s perspective, in theory they should be interested in a modest-growth industry, 
although the most important factor is that the target company’s industry would be stable enough 
to ensure stable cash flows. 
 
H5: Strategic (Financial) acquirers prefer high-growth (modest-growth) industries. 
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Fama and French (1995) show that firms with a low market price relative to the book value of 
equity tend to be distressed and have relatively low earnings. 3  On the other hand, companies 
with high market prices relative to the book values have high returns and high growth rates. 
Adam and Goyal (2008) show in their study that market to book equity is a reasonable proxy 
for growth opportunities, although they show that market value of assets to total book value of 
assets is even a better proxy. Because of the value-creation-oriented approach of financial 
buyers, and the growth-oriented approach of strategic buyers, I expect especially strategic 
acquirers to value growth opportunities more. 
 
H6:  Strategic (Financial) acquirers prefer industries that have high (low) market-to-book 
ratios.  
 
I will call combined hypotheses H2-H6 as the industry preference hypotheses for different 
acquirer types throughout this paper. 
Finally, I expect the industry-level differences described in hypotheses H2-H6 to have 
different impacts on premiums paid by financial and strategic acquirers in accordance with 
each reasoning behind each hypothesis. Because hypotheses H2-H6 split the two types of 
acquirers’ industry preferences quite well into what is defined as mature and growth industry4, 
my last hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H7:  Strategic (Financial) buyer values more, hence pays more premium, for target 
companies in growth (mature) industries based on previous hypotheses (H2-H6). 
 
3 Data  
3.1 Sample acquisitions  
I used similar requirements as Bargeron et al. (2008) did for the sample acquisitions. I collected 
from the SDC database all US domestic mergers and acquisitions with a public target company 
                                                 
3 Nevertheless, some investors see low market to book ratio as an opportunity, because this implicates that there 
could be unrealized or unliquidated value in the company. 
4 Although one can argue that the leverage is not as much related to the life-cycle of an industry as it is to the 
nature of an industry, I make here an exception and include it as part of hypothesis H7 for simplifying reasons. 
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announced between 1.1.2000 and 31.12.2015. I required acquirer to own at least 90%5 of shares 
after the transaction and acquire at least 85%6 in the transaction. Further, I required the acquirer 
to hold at most 1%7 of shares six months prior to announcement. To make an apples-to-apples 
comparison, I required the acquisition to be an all-cash deal. In addition, I excluded all spinoffs, 
recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, privatizations and sellers of a 
minority interests. Further, I required all the transactions to have complete information about 
premiums and company-specific data for targets described later in this paper. This left me with 
882 transactions, of which 256 had financial acquirer and 626 had strategic acquirer according 
to the SDC database.8 
 
3.2 Premium data  
For the premium9 calculations, I obtained simple premium data from the SDC database. Those 
premiums included one day, one week and four weeks returns in target’s share price prior to 
the announcement day. The premiums are based on relative change in target’s share price and 
the method is presented in the Equation 1. 
 
SDC-based one day, one week, and four weeks premiums are calculated as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 =
𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑−𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒
 ,    (1) 
where 𝑃𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 is the closing price of target company’s share on the announcement 
day of the acquisition, and 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 is the closing price of target company’s share one 
day, one week or four weeks prior to the announcement day 
 
In addition, I obtained daily return data from CRSP database for my sample of target 
companies. I used the returns to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in target’s share 
                                                 
5 In the U.S. the acquirer can use their right to make a compulsory acquisition of remaining minority shares 
when they own at least 90 % of the target company’s shares.  
6 In the U.S. the acquirer can buy up to 5 % of target’s shares without filing the acquisition to the authorities. 
7 For this research, I expect the buyers to be coming from outside the company. 
8 SDC uses following definition for financial acquirers: “the acquiring company is buying a non-financial target 
company for financial reasons rather than for strategic reasons. The acquiring company is considered a financial 
company and can either be a buyout firm, a venture capital company, a merchant bank, a commercial bank or an 
investment bank.” 
9 In lack of a better knowledge, I estimated target companies’ stand-alone values to be the market price before the 
announcement day of acquisition. The premiums used throughout this paper are based on market reactions to the 
announcement of acquisition on the target company’s share price. 
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price for three-, five-, and eleven-day windows around the announcement day of the acquisition 
to further estimate the premiums paid. Calculation method for the cumulative abnormal returns 
is presented in Equations 2 and 3. 
 
Abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
  
    𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑟𝑖𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 − 𝑟𝑖𝑆&𝑃500 ,    (2) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖 is the abnormal return on day 𝑖, 𝑟𝑖𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 is the daily return of the target 
company’s share on day 𝑖, and 𝑟𝑖𝑆&𝑃500 is the daily return of S&P 500 index on day 𝑖. 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑇
𝑖=1  ,     (3) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇 is the cumulative abnormal return during a time window of  𝑇 days. 
Note: CAR calculations are calculated in time windows starting (T – 1) / 2 days 
before the announcement day. 
 
3.3 Industry and company-specific data  
I calculated the needed industry data from all the U.S. domestic company data available in the 
Compustat database for each year of my acquisition sample.10 First, I took out all the duplicates, 
because some companies had separate yearly data for different issues.11 Second, I calculated 
each company’s ratios that I needed on yearly basis.12 Third, I used the boxplot method 
introduced by Tukey (1977) to detect outliers in company data and to trim them out. Finally, I 
calculated yearly industry-level ratios by taking the average of the company ratios within an 
industry. I classified companies to be in the same industry based on companies’ primary 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes’ first two numbers. In addition, I calculated some 
company-level ratios for control variables that I discuss later, and required all target companies 
to have these ratios available. 
                                                 
10 In addition, to calculate five year compound growth rate and three year average return on equity, I needed to 
obtain data from earlier years as well. In total, the Compustat data included 21,967 individual companies across 
the 20-year window I used to derive industry ratios. 
11 Based on last two numbers of 8-digit company-specific CUSIP code. 
12  I wanted to use data that was most likely available to the public prior to the announcement, so I used previous 
year’s data for each acquisition. 
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Last, to combine the data from different databases, I used target companies’ 6-digit 
CUSIP codes, 4-digit SIC codes and the announcement dates provided by the SDC database as 
the common identifier for the data. Because Compustat and CRSP database use 8-digit CUSIP 
codes, I had to change them into 6-digit codes first. I used the first two numbers of targets’ SIC 
codes to identify their industry. Since I used yearly data, I decided to merge the deal and 
company-specific data by the acquisition announcement year and the target company’s 
previous fiscal year.13 
 
3.4 Limitations in data  
There were several limitations in data, of which some I will address in robustness checks in 
Section 5. I used only U.S. domestic deals, because that data was well recorded compared to 
international data. I argue that it was reasonable to use widely accepted boxplot method to 
detect and trim out the outliers, since the industry means in original data did not correlate with 
the medians. As for other limitations, the industry ratios were calculated as simple averages of 
companies operating in the same industry with no weights added. Also, I had to calculate the 
industry ratios only based on available company ratios.14 Because there is no comprehensive 
industry data available, the method I used works as a reasonable approximation for the industry 
ratios. In addition, combining data from three different databases with different company 
identifiers15 forced me to drop a significant amount of sample deals. Nevertheless, because the 
sample size remained relatively large, and the missing data was assumably randomly 
distributed, I consider the sample of acquisitions used in this paper representative for this 
research. 
 
4 Methodology and results  
In this section I discuss the methods I used to test my hypotheses, and present the results. In 
the end of this section, I will discuss the interpretation of the results and what do they mean 
from the point of view of my hypotheses. 
 
 
                                                 
13 This way I would also see if the data has any predictive power on the acquisition premiums. 
14 Not all companies had data available for each year, and company data was only for public companies. 
15 6-digit and 8-digit CUSIP codes as well as CRSP’s company permanent numbers. 
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Table 1 
Average premiums by different acquirer types 
 This table presents average [median] premiums target companies gained in U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 divided by two acquirer types, strategic and financial. CAR3, CAR5 and CAR11 are cumulative abnormal returns for target company shareholders in 3-, 5-, and 11-day windows around the announcement date of acquisition, respectively. Premium 1 day, 
Premium 1 week, and Premium 4 weeks are relative changes of target company’s closing share prices on the announcement date and one day, one week and four weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Student’s t-tests are conducted between averages of the two groups and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are conducted between medians of the two groups. t-statistics, W-statistics and p-values are provided. CAR data is obtained from the CRSP database and the rest premium and acquisition data is from the SDC database. Data covers 882 acquisitions of which 626 are by strategic acquirers and 256 are by financial acquirers. 
 
  Acquirer Strategic - Financial   Average [Median] Strategic Financial Difference t-value  [W-value] p-value          
CAR3 0.3153 0.3309 0.2774 0.0535 2.1956 0.0287 *  [0.2457] [0.2788] [0.1939] [0.0849] [95630] [<0.0001] ***         CAR5 0.3189 0.3345 0.2807 0.0538 2.2045 0.0280 *  [0.2557] [0.2874] [0.1998] [0.0876] [95506] [<0.0001] ***         CAR11 0.3297 0.3475 0.2863 0.0613 2.5390 0.0115 *  [0.2663] [0.3029] [0.1945] [0.1083] [96674] [<0.0001] ***         Premium 1 day 0.3632 0.3828 0.3152 0.0676 2.5762 0.0103 *  [0.3102] [0.3275] [0.2482] [0.0794] [95386] [<0.0001] ***         Premium 1 week 0.3836 0.4044 0.3328 0.0716 2.7279 0.0066 **  [0.3184] [0.3409] [0.2500] [0.0909] [96241] [<0.0001] ***         Premium 4 weeks 0.4439 0.4791 0.3580 0.1211 3.4635 0.0006 ***  [0.3494] [0.3877] [0.2768] [0.1110] [98967] [<0.0001] ***         Note:    *p<0.05; **p<0.01 ***p<0.001  
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4.1 Tests for differences in premiums paid  
To test the hypothesis H1 to see whether financial acquirer pays less premium than strategic 
buyer does, I used the same method as Bargeron et al. (2008). I divided premiums into two 
groups based on the acquirer type, and conducted Student’s t-test on groups’ means and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test on group’s medians. As expected, the test results show that strategic 
buyers pay more premium than financial acquirers do. 
 Table 1 shows that the means and medians of the two groups’ premiums are different at 
95 % confidence level. Further, all medians are different at 99.9 % confidence level based on 
the rank-sum tests. The average premium paid by a strategic buyer based on 5-day window 
(CAR5) measure was 33 % while for financial buyer the premium was 28 % over the target’s 
stand-alone price. Moreover, based on the SDC’s four-week premiums, a financial acquirer 
paid on average twelve percentage points less premium than a strategic acquirer did. The results 
are similar throughout the premium tests. Therefore, hypothesis H1 seems to hold true. 
 
4.2 Tests for differences in industry-related preferences  
To test hypotheses H2-H6, I made similar tests as with the tests for premiums paid. Again, I 
divided sample acquisitions into two groups based on the acquirer type, and conducted t-tests 
for means and rank-sum tests for medians of industry-level leverage, R&D, profitability, 
growth, and market-to-book measures for those groups. The detailed information on the 
measures and calculations behind are provided in Table 2. 
To test each hypothesis I used relative measures of industry characteristics to make 
them more comparable. As mentioned previously, I used industry ratios of previous fiscal year 
in relation to the announcement date. Most of the industry ratios used are self-explanatory and 
in accordance with my hypotheses. Using R&D expenses divided by company’s assets should 
provide a comparable ratio for R&D investments across the sample acquisitions. According to 
Palepu et al. (2013), return on equity (ROE) is a comprehensive measure for firm’s 
performance and profitability. Moreover, the three-year average ROE reflects the stability in  
profits better than just a previous year’s ROE. Just as the average ROE, so does the compound 
annual growth rate take into account stability better than the one year change in sales. Naturally, 
it also shows the growth and the medium term trend in the industry. 
Table 2 shows the results for the industry preference tests on hypotheses H2-H6. Based 
on these tests, hypotheses H2-H4 for different preferences in industries’ leverage, R&D 
investments, and profitability hold true. The average industry leverage for targets of financial  
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Table 2 
Industry-level preferences of different acquirer types 
 This table presents average [median] target company industry characteristics in U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 divided by two acquirer types, strategic and financial. 
Leverage is the previous fiscal year’s industry average total liabilities divided by common book equity. 
This industry-ratio tests hypothesis H2. R&D is the previous fiscal year’s industry average R&D 
expenses divided by total book value of assets. This industry-ratio tests hypothesis H3. ROE is an 
industry average of three previous fiscal year averages of net income divided by common book equity. 
This industry-ratio tests hypothesis H4. CAGR is an industry average compound annual growth rate 
of revenues in five previous fiscal years. This industry-ratio tests hypothesis H5. Market-to-Book is 
the previous fiscal year’s industry average market value of equity divided by common book equity. 
This industry ratio tests hypothesis H6.  Student’s t-tests are conducted between averages of the two groups and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are conducted between medians of the two groups. t-statistics, W-statistics and p-values are provided. Industry data is obtained and derived from company-specific data from the Compustat database and the acquisition data is from the SDC database. Data covers 882 acquisitions of which 626 are by strategic acquirers and 256 are by financial acquirers. 
  Acquirer Strategic - Financial  
 All Strategic Financial Difference Statistic p-value  Leverage 1.7076 1.8157 1.4432 0.3724 2.6418 0.0084 ** 
 [0.9056] [0.8996] [0.9870] [-0.0874] [71825] [0.0156] * 
        
R&D  0.0720 0.0772 0.0593 0.0178 3.7695 0.0002 *** 
 [0.0882] [0.0900] [0.0648] [0.0252] [92892] [0.0002] *** 
        
ROE 0.0092 0.0008 0.0297 -0.0288 -3.7464 0.0002 ***  [0.0416] [0.0406] [0.0515] [-0.0108] [69022] [0.0012] ** 
        
CAGR 0.0639 0.0653 0.0605 0.0048 1.6122 0.1075  
 [0.0639] [0.0607] [0.0614] [-0.0007] [82219] [0.5427]  
        Market-to-Book 2.4375 2.4349 2.4439 -0.0090 -0.1436 0.8859  
 [2.3134] [2.3045] [2.3594] [-0.0549] [79091] [0.7627]  
Note:    *p<0.05; **p<0.01 ***p<0.001  
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buyers is 1.44 while it is 1.81 for the strategic buyer. The average industry R&D investments 
for targets are also higher for the strategic acquirer and statistically the difference in both means 
and medians is significant at 99.9 % confidence level. The average industry profitability for 
targets measured by three-year average return on equity, is on the other hand on average 3 %-
points higher for financial acquirers than for strategic. All the results are statistically significant 
at the 95 % confidence level. 
 Based on the t-tests for means and rank-sum tests for medians, strategic and financial 
acquirers have no differences in preferences for growth or market-to-book measures of target 
companies’ industry. Therefore, hypotheses H5 and H6 do not seem to hold true based on these 
tests. The fact that both groups’ targets have similar and low16 industry growth rates might 
implicate that as expected, financial acquirers prefer modest-growth industries. As for the 
strategic buyers, the result might be driven by intra-industry acquisition. Owen and Yawson 
(2010) show that a corporation in a mature state is more likely to become a bidder. This might 
also apply at the industry-level, because there would be more growth through acquisitions in 
such industries.17 In addition, the two groups’ industry market-to-book ratio averages are quite 
close to the market averages18, which implicates that it might not be a significant factor in 
acquisition decisions for the two groups. 
 
4.3 Tests for differences in value of industry characteristics  
Next, I tested whether the differences in acquirers’ preferences would explain differences in 
premiums paid. I ran multiple linear regressions on the total sample, and on two separate groups 
of the sample based on the acquirer type. I used premiums as dependent variables, and previous 
year’s industry characteristics introduced earlier as independent variables. In addition, I used 
the target’s Q-ratio and size, profitability and leverage measures as well as indicator variables 
of deal characteristics as control variables for the regressions. The definitions and methods for 
calculations of the control variables are provided in Table 3. The rationale behind the selection 
of these control variables is based on the paper of Bargeron et al. (2008). 
                                                 
16 Market’s average historic growth rate for sales is higher than the sample average during most of the years 
included in my sample acquisitions. This is based on comparison with a yearly data collected by Professor 
Damodaran at NYU Stern. 
17 Although Schoenberg and Reeves (1999) show that high industry growth rate is an important factor in high 
acquisition activity, it might be that the strategic acquirers at mature state begin their bidding activity with intra-
industry acquisitions. 
18 In absolute values based on data collected by Professor Damodaran at NYU Stern. 
16  
 Table 3 provides results from the regression models. Based on the linear model for the 
whole sample, the financial acquirer indicator variable is statistically significant at 95 % 
confidence level. This implicates that the model does not fully explain why the different types 
of acquirers pay different premiums. All industry ratios, except for the three-year average ROE, 
have statistically significant explanatory power over the premium size. Compound annual 
growth rate has largest economic significance, with a coefficient of 0.583 in the CAR5-model. 
On other words, one percentage change in industry’s growth rate should change the premium 
by around half a percent. Industry leverage and market-to-book ratio have negative coefficients 
in the linear models. Although they are quite insignificant in the economic scale, they are 
statistically significant. For market-to-book ratio, this implicates that acquirers pay less 
premium for higher proxy of growth opportunities. It might be, that there is so much future 
expectations, and hence risk of uncertainty in an industry with a high market-to-book ratio, that 
acquirers prefer to use rather conservative synergy estimations when approaching targets in 
such industries. 
 I also wanted to compare, how this regression model would explain premiums paid in 
a sample of only financial acquirers versus strategic acquirers. Table 3 provides regressions 
with CAR5 and one-day premium as dependent variables for financial acquisitions in Columns 
(3) and (4), and for strategic acquisitions in Columns (5) and (6), respectively. The only 
industry ratio that is statistically significant in both subsets of the sample data is leverage. 
Although industry leverage has little economic explanatory power, it is systematically, 
throughout the different dependent premium variables, approximately twice as large for 
financial acquirers as it is for strategic, implying that industry-level leverage would be more 
important for a financial acquirer. 
 In addition to leverage, only the industry three-year-average ROE seems to have a 
statistically significant explanatory power over the premiums paid by financial acquirers. 
Comparing the industry ROE coefficients and their standard errors between premiums paid in 
different acquisition groups suggests, that industry ROE is significantly more valuable to a 
financial acquirer than to a strategic acquirer. For instance, in CAR5-model, for financial 
acquirer the ROE coefficient is 0.546 and the standard error is 0.306, while for strategic  
 acquirer the values are -0.080 and 0.144 respectively.19 This implicates that the hypothesis H4 
for financial acquirers preferring and valuing industries with a stable positive profits holds true. 
 
                                                 
19 See Appendix B for more comprehensive table. 
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Table 3 Effects of industry characteristics on premiums paid by different acquirer types   The sample includes 882 U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 obtained from the SDC database. This table presents results from multiple linear regressions, where premium is the dependent variable, and industry characteristics are independent variables. There are also seven target and deal related control variables. Financial Acquiror is an indicator variable for a financial acquisition based on SDC database. Leverage is the previous fiscal year’s industry average 
total liabilities divided by common book equity. R&D is the previous fiscal year’s industry average 
R&D expenses divided by total book value of assets. ROE is an industry average of three previous fiscal 
year averages of net income divided by common book equity. CAGR is an industry average compound 
annual growth rate of revenues in five previous fiscal years. Market-to-Book is the previous fiscal year’s 
industry average market value of equity divided by common book equity. CAR5 is the cumulative abnormal return for target company shareholders in 5-day windows around the announcement date of acquisition. Premium one day is the relative change in target company’s closing share prices on the announcement date and one day prior to the announcement date. lnMVEComp is target-company’s 
logarithmic market value of equity, and indicates company’s size. TobinsQComp is target company’s market value of equity and total liabilities divided by its total assets, and indicates company’s Q-ratio. 
ROAComp is target company’s net income divided by its total assets, and indicates profitability. 
DebtAssetsComp is target company’s total liabilities divided by its total assets, and indicates 
company’s leverage. Tender is an indicator value to see whether the announcement was a tender offer. TTermFee is an indicator value to see whether the target had signed a termination fee contract. Alockup is an indicator value to see whether the acquirer had a lockup provision in the acquisition. Regressions (1) and (2) are made on the whole sample, Regressions (3) and (4) are made on financial acquisitions, and Regressions (5) and (6) are made on strategic acquisitions. Industry and target data is obtained and derived from company-specific data from the Compustat database. The acquisition and Premium one day data is from the SDC database. CAR5 data is obtained from the CRSP database.    All acquisitions Financial acquisitions Strategic acquisitions     
 CAR5 Premium one day CAR5 Premium one day CAR5 Premium one day  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Financial Acquiror -0.048** -0.069***            R&D 0.425* 0.549** 0.331 0.505 0.419* 0.545**        ROE 0.046 0.069 0.546* 0.684** -0.080 -0.086        Leverage -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.028** -0.037** -0.011* -0.018***        CAGR 0.583** 0.549** -0.129 0.046 0.705** 0.582**        Market-to-Book -0.025* -0.040** 0.012 -0.014 -0.033* -0.047***        lnMVEComp -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.078*** -0.072*** -0.022*** -0.031***        TobinsQComp -0.013 -0.009 -0.017 -0.011 -0.008 -0.002        ROAComp -0.083** -0.069* -0.298*** -0.359*** -0.050 -0.011        DebtAssetsComp 0.026 0.061 0.052 0.061 0.031 0.087*        Tender 0.066*** 0.031 0.107** 0.040 0.047* 0.022        TTermFee 0.055* 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.036        Alockup -0.112 -0.241*   -0.088 -0.211        Observations 882 882 256 256 626 626        Adjusted R2 0.095 0.092 0.213 0.174 0.056 0.059   Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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 The regression results for strategic acquisitions are very similar to the results on the 
whole sample. Industry’s R&D investments and growth rates seem to have a significant 
statistical and economic power on premiums strategic acquirers pay, with CAR5-model 
coefficients of 0.419 and 0.705, respectively. Based on these results, strategic acquirers are 
ready to pay more premium for a target company in a growing and innovation-oriented 
industries. Inspecting the same industry ratios in financial acquisitions’ regressions, the 
standard errors are larger and coefficients smaller than in strategic acquirer models. This 
implies that these ratios do not strongly affect the premiums paid by financial acquirers, but 
they can still be relatively important in making the takeover decisions. 
Nevertheless, R-squared values are systematically larger in regression models for 
financial acquisitions than for strategic ones. For example, the adjusted R-squared for CAR5-
model in financial acquisitions is 0.213, while the same value for strategic acquisitions is 0.056 
in the same linear model. This might suggest that target company’s industry has a bigger impact 
in the amount of premium paid, for the financial acquirer than for the strategic acquirer. 
Although this would seem reasonable and consistent with the theory provided by DePamphilis 
(2015), the topic requires further research. Also, the control variables used are not adjusted for 
different groups,20 so the comparison of the linear models is rather suggestive. 
 All in all, the results are similar throughout all the regressions with different premiums 
being the dependent variables. More detailed tables of the results are included in Appendix A 
and B. 
 
4.4 Interpretations of the results  
Based on the tests conducted and discussed previously in this section, I conclude with the 
interpretation of the results on the hypotheses. First, hypothesis H1 holds true. Financial 
acquirers indeed pay less premium than strategic acquirers. Second, hypothesis H2 holds true 
as well. In addition to the fact that financial acquirers do seem to prefer industries with a low 
leverage, they clearly value it in premium calculations. Third, hypothesis H3 holds true on 
acquirer type preferences. Strategic acquirers clearly prefer industries with more R&D activity. 
Fourth, H4 holds true. Steady profitability is important determinant for financial acquirer’s 
takeover decision. Fifth, there are mixed results for hypothesis H5 tests. From the financial 
acquirer’s perspective, the hypothesis about growth holds true in preferences, but it does not 
                                                 
20 Except for indicator variable for acquirer’s lockup provision, that is removed from financial acquirer subset 
model because none of the acquisitions in this group have that provision. 
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affect the premium valuation and vice versa for strategic acquirer. Sixth, hypothesis H6 does 
not hold true. If anything can be said about the industry market-to-book ratio, it seems that 
contrary to the hypothesis, strategic buyer pays more for a target in a low market-to-book 
industry. Last, hypothesis H7 cannot be rejected. There is suggestive evidence that industry 
matters, and especially the theory that financial acquirers prefer mature industries seems to 
hold. Nevertheless, different acquirers are driven by different motives, so further and more 
comprehensive research on the topic is required.  
 
5 Robustness checks and other tests  
To address limitations in data, and choices I made in deal, industry, and target characteristics, 
I conducted several robustness checks. I tested same hypotheses with a similar sample of 
acquisitions as previously, but included also non-cash deals. To test the industry ratio 
robustness, I tested the hypotheses using median numbers for industry characteristics instead 
of means of outlier-trimmed data. In addition, I tested different ratios to approximate target’s 
size, profitability and leverage used as control variables. I will discuss these tests next. 
 
5.1 Non-cash deals included   
It appears that including non-cash or mixed cash and stock deals to the sample acquisitions 
might not hold true with the first hypothesis H1 of differences in premiums between financial 
and strategic acquirers as strongly as in all-cash-deals sample. Student’s t-tests return no 
statistical significance for differences in CAR-based premiums. Only the four weeks to 
announcement day premium is significant at 10 %-level, having a p-value of 0.06. On the other 
hand, all premium measures, except for CAR5, indicate significant differences in premiums 
paid by different acquirers at 95 % confidence level according to Wilcoxon rank-sum tests on 
medians.  
In the robustness check for extended sample with non-cash deals included, the 
differences in different acquirers’ industry preferences are similar with the previous results. 
Additionally, the industry’s market-to-book seems to be statistically different for the two 
groups of acquirers, strategic acquirers seemingly preferring targets in industries with lower 
average market-to-book ratios than financial acquirers do. This might implicate, that strategic 
acquirers prefer to get more tangible assets in return for their stock. On the other hand, financial 
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acquirers might prefer industries that have growth opportunities, and where they can sell a 
company with a high price relative to the book value of equity. 
Applying similar multiple regressions as in previous section on the sample data 
including the non-cash deals, I get similar results as with the multiple regressions for all-cash 
deals. It is important to notice, that I do not change or add any control variables when adding 
the non-cash deals to regression model. In the regression model for the whole data sample, the 
indicator variable for financial acquirer loses its significance, but is of similar scale and sign. 
Further, based on R-squared it seems that the industry-based model resumes to have larger 
explanatory power for premiums paid by financial acquirers over strategic buyers. A detailed 
regression table is included in Appendix C. 
 
5.2 Industry medians instead of averages   
In this paper, I chose to remove the outliers from company data to calculate average yearly 
characteristics for each industry. Because the company data from Compustat database was very 
noisy, the other option was to use medians from the noisy data.21 I decided to use those yearly 
industry medians for a robustness check. Tests for industry-related preferences derived similar 
results as when using outlier-trimmed industry averages. Also, multiple regressions, to test 
whether the industry characteristics had an effect in different premiums paid, returned mainly 
similar coefficients. The main difference between the median and average industry ratios was 
in reduced statistical significance of industry R&D in linear model. This seemed strange, 
because the correlation coefficient between the median and average industry R&D-to-assets 
ratios was quite large at 0.896. A detailed regression table is in Appendix D. 
 
5.3 Other robustness checks  
In addition to the two major robustness tests on sample and industry data, I also made several 
smaller robustness checks that I do not report here, for different measures of industry and target 
characteristics. For instance, I replicated the tests by changing the three year average ROE to 
previous year’s ROE, debt-to-equity to debt-to-assets, market-to-book to Q-ratio, and market 
value of equity to revenues. These robustness checks did not change the results or 
interpretations significantly, and were mainly in line with the results from the main research.  
                                                 
21 As I mentioned previously in this paper, the means and medians form the noisy data did not have any correlation. 
Also, the means were economically unrealistic to represent industry-level averages, hence I did not even consider 
using means calculated from the noisy data. 
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Since the SDC database had other grouping methods for different types of financial 
acquirers, I decided to test whether the results using those groupings would be similar as with 
the SDC’s financial acquirer indicator. Groupings I tested were based on SDC’s LBO firm, 
financial sponsor, and investor group acquirer indicators.22 The results were similar to the main 
research for LBO firms and financial sponsors. The deal grouping based on investor groups, 
on the other hand, did not return similar results. This is due to the fact that investor groups are 
not necessarily acquiring companies for financial reasons. Often, the investor groups are 
involved in management buyouts, where the current management needs outside financing to 
take control over the company. Although investors do mostly plan an exit strategy in these cases 
as well, the situation is different from when they are simply looking for a good investment. 
Therefore, a takeover affiliated with an investor group does not necessarily mean that the 
takeover would be what is considered as a financial acquisition. 
In addition, I tried to see whether there were any signs of clustering between the 
strategic and financial acquirers’ target-industry characteristics, relative to the premiums paid. 
I do not report the result in a graph, because there was no indication of clustering. It appears 
that although industry characteristics do seem to have different attractiveness to different types 
of acquirers, these differences in buyers’ preference explain little about the differences in 
premiums paid.  
 
6 Conclusion  
In this paper, I have researched how industry characteristics drive the takeover decisions and 
different premiums financial and strategic acquirers pay. First, I have shown that financial 
acquirers pay less premium than strategic acquirers do. This holds with previous research 
(Bargeron et al., 2008) and theory of synergies. Second, I have analyzed how different industry 
characteristics affect the acquisition preferences of the two acquirer types. Third, I tested 
multilinear regression models controlling target and deal characteristics to see, whether the 
                                                 
22 SDC defines acquirer types mentioned as follows:  
LBO Firm: “the acquiror company in a transaction is a buyout firm regardless of the nature of the 
transaction itself.” 
Financial Sponsor: “companies that engage in private equity or venture capital transactions using capital 
raised by investors. A company is considered a financial sponsor when it engages in non-strategic 
acquisitions acting as a financial buyer.” 
Investor Group: “group of investors, companies, individuals, or investment firms. -- If an ESOP 
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan) is the only acquiror, the acquiror is not considered an investor group. 
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industry characteristics would affect premiums paid differently for different acquirers. Finally, 
I addressed to limitations in data with robustness tests. 
I found that strategic and financial acquirers are driven by different target company’s 
industry characteristics. As I expected, financial acquirers seem to prefer companies in 
industries with relatively low R&D expenses. In addition, industry with a steady, positive ROE 
and relatively low leverage seem to attract financial acquirers. In contrary to what I expected, 
target’s five-year compound annual industry growth rate seems to be on average at the same 
level in financial and strategic acquisitions. Still, as I expected, the strategic buyer values 
growth more than the financial acquirer based on the premium paid. Also, industries’ high 
market-to-book seem to have negative, yet economically little, impact on the premiums paid. 
Based on the multiple linear regression, the five industry characteristics affect 
premiums paid by the two acquirer types differently. In the regression model for the whole 
sample, all the industry characteristics but the three-year average ROE seemed to have 
explanatory power on premiums paid. However, when dividing the sample data into two groups 
based on the acquirer type, and applying the same linear model, it seems that different industry 
characteristics have different explanatory power over premiums paid by strategic and financial 
acquirers. Moreover, it seems that the target company’s industry has a higher relevance in 
premiums paid for a financial acquirer than for a strategic one. In addition, financial acquirer 
does seem to prefer mature industries as DePamphilis (2015) described. 
Although this paper provides an answer on question whether industry characteristics 
drive differences in premiums paid by strategic and financial acquirers, it is still somewhat 
unclear what the true value of the industry is for different types of acquirers, and what part it 
plays on significantly different premiums paid by the two acquirer types. Another question 
arising is, what other industry-related characteristics would drive differences in premiums paid 
and how all the industry characteristics contribute to other deal-related characteristics when 
trying to answer the question why do financial buyers pay less for acquisitions.  
In this paper, I examined a narrow set of industry characteristics. Further research 
should be conducted to see how industries’ economic situation, cycles, and the private equity 
firms’ clubbing behavior affects the differences in premiums paid by financial and strategic 
acquirers. Moreover, the question why strategic acquirers do not simply outbid financial buyers 
should be addressed in further financial research. 
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Appendix A Industry-level model for premium prediction  The sample includes 882 U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 obtained from the SDC database. This table presents results from multiple linear regressions, where premium is the dependent variable, and industry characteristics are independent variables. There are also seven target company and deal related control variables. Results show coefficients for independent variables and standard errors in the brackets.    CAR3 CAR5 CAR11 Premium1day Premium1week Premium4weeks  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)   Financial Acquiror -0.050** -0.048** -0.052** -0.069*** -0.068*** -0.096**  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039)        R&D 0.427* 0.425* 0.477** 0.549** 0.660*** 0.557  (0.219) (0.219) (0.223) (0.234) (0.237) (0.372)        ROE 0.060 0.046 0.068 0.069 0.035 -0.163  (0.131) (0.131) (0.134) (0.140) (0.142) (0.222)        Leverage -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.022**  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)        CAGR 0.510** 0.583** 0.532** 0.549** 0.633** 1.295***  (0.248) (0.247) (0.253) (0.264) (0.267) (0.420)        Market-to-Book -0.020 -0.025* -0.026* -0.040** -0.047*** -0.036  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.025)        lnMVEComp -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.040***  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.012)        TobinsQComp -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.021  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016)        ROAComp -0.078** -0.083** -0.071* -0.069* -0.089** -0.203***  (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.061)        Debt-to- AssetsComp 0.026 0.026 0.018 0.061 0.082* 0.114*  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.067)        Tender 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.031 0.039 -0.004  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041)        TTermFee 0.060** 0.055* 0.059* 0.046 0.035 -0.019  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.050)        ALockup -0.179 -0.112 -0.006 -0.241* 0.073 1.950***  (0.124) (0.124) (0.127) (0.132) (0.134) (0.211)        Constant 0.487*** 0.491*** 0.500*** 0.601*** 0.621*** 0.670***  (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.101)        Observations 882 882 882 882 882 882 R2 0.106 0.108 0.104 0.105 0.125 0.196 Adjusted R2 0.092 0.095 0.091 0.092 0.112 0.184 Residual Std. Error (df = 868) 0.297 0.296 0.303 0.317 0.320 0.504 F Statistic  (df = 13; 868) 7.894*** 8.089*** 7.753*** 7.836*** 9.551*** 16.300*** Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
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Appendix B  Effects of industry characteristics on premiums paid by different acquirer types The sample includes 882 U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 obtained from the SDC database. This table presents results from multiple linear regressions, where premium is the dependent variable, and industry characteristics are independent variables. There are also seven target company and deal related control variables. Results show coefficients for independent variables and standard errors in the brackets. First two regressions are linear regressions driven on the whole sample. Regressions (3) and (4) are for financial acquisitions. Regressions (5) and (6) are for strategic acquisitions.   All acquisitions Financial acquisitions Strategic acquisitions 
 CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Financial Acquiror -0.048** -0.069***      (0.023) (0.024)            R&D 0.425* 0.549** 0.331 0.505 0.419* 0.545**  (0.219) (0.234) (0.549) (0.609) (0.235) (0.248)        ROE 0.046 0.069 0.546* 0.684** -0.080 -0.086  (0.131) (0.140) (0.306) (0.339) (0.144) (0.152)        Leverage -0.014*** -0.021*** -0.028** -0.037** -0.011* -0.018***  (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006)        CAGR 0.583** 0.549** -0.129 0.046 0.705** 0.582**  (0.247) (0.264) (0.565) (0.627) (0.273) (0.288)        Market-to-Book -0.025* -0.040** 0.012 -0.014 -0.033* -0.047***  (0.015) (0.016) (0.029) (0.032) (0.017) (0.018)        lnMVEComp -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.078*** -0.072*** -0.022*** -0.031***  (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009)        
TobinsQComp -0.013 -0.009 -0.017 -0.011 -0.008 -0.002  (0.010) (0.010) (0.027) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011)        ROAComp -0.083** -0.069* -0.298*** -0.359*** -0.050 -0.011  (0.036) (0.038) (0.096) (0.107) (0.042) (0.044)        DebtAssets Comp 0.026 0.061 0.052 0.061 0.031 0.087*  (0.039) (0.042) (0.077) (0.085) (0.047) (0.049)        Tender 0.066*** 0.031 0.107** 0.040 0.047* 0.022  (0.024) (0.026) (0.050) (0.056) (0.027) (0.028)        TTermFee 0.055* 0.046 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.036  (0.030) (0.032) (0.053) (0.059) (0.035) (0.037)        ALockup -0.112 -0.241*   -0.088 -0.211  (0.124) (0.132)   (0.122) (0.128)        Constant 0.491*** 0.601*** 0.614*** 0.665*** 0.419*** 0.542***  (0.059) (0.063) (0.115) (0.128) (0.068) (0.072)        Observations 882 882 256 256 626 626 R2 0.108 0.105 0.247 0.210 0.074 0.077 Adjusted R2 0.095 0.092 0.213 0.174 0.056 0.059 Residual Std. Error 0.296  (df = 868) 0.317 (df = 868) 0.302  (df = 244) 0.335  (df = 244) 0.289  (df = 613) 0.305  (df = 613) 
F Statistic 8.089*** (df = 13; 868) 7.836***  (df = 13; 868) 7.288*** (df = 11; 244) 5.890***  (df = 11; 244) 4.093*** (df = 12; 613) 4.242*** (df = 12; 613) Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Appendix C Effects of industry characteristics on premiums paid by different acquirer types (mixed)  The sample includes 1657 U.S. domestic mixed cash and stock acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 obtained from the SDC database. This table presents results from multiple linear regressions, where premium is the dependent variable, and industry characteristics are independent variables. There are also seven target company and deal related control variables. Results show coefficients for independent variables and standard errors in the brackets. First two regressions are linear regressions driven on the whole sample. Regressions (3) and (4) are for financial acquisitions. Regressions (5) and (6) are for strategic acquisitions.  All acquisitions Financial acquisitions Strategic acquisitions   CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Financial Acquiror -0.016 -0.149      (0.017) (0.126)     R&D 0.563*** 1.672 0.486 0.816 0.559*** 1.842  (0.158) (1.162) (0.464) (0.519) (0.167) (1.393) ROE 0.182** 0.980 0.540** 0.779*** 0.124 1.005  (0.084) (0.619) (0.253) (0.283) (0.088) (0.737) Leverage -0.010*** -0.043** -0.026*** -0.040*** -0.008*** -0.048**  (0.003) (0.020) (0.010) (0.011) (0.003) (0.024) CAGR 0.126 1.059 -0.073 0.015 0.155 1.222  (0.142) (1.043) (0.426) (0.477) (0.149) (1.243) Market-to-Book -0.014 -0.099 0.003 -0.018 -0.015 -0.123  (0.009) (0.069) (0.025) (0.027) (0.010) (0.085) lnMVEComp -0.035*** -0.050 -0.062*** -0.058*** -0.030*** -0.050  (0.004) (0.031) (0.011) (0.012) (0.005) (0.038) TobinsQComp -0.002 -0.013 -0.027 -0.027 0.003 -0.0004  (0.006) (0.045) (0.022) (0.025) (0.006) (0.054) ROAComp -0.052** -0.136 -0.272*** -0.331*** -0.026 -0.090  (0.025) (0.180) (0.083) (0.093) (0.026) (0.217) DebtAssetsComp 0.020 0.192 0.067 0.061 0.017 0.261  (0.027) (0.198) (0.062) (0.069) (0.030) (0.254) Tender 0.104*** -0.026 0.112** 0.047 0.098*** -0.049  (0.019) (0.136) (0.046) (0.051) (0.020) (0.167) TTermFee 0.028 -0.310** 0.021 0.034 0.027 -0.415**  (0.020) (0.144) (0.045) (0.050) (0.022) (0.182)        ALockup -0.007 -0.203   -0.007 -0.214  (0.064) (0.470)   (0.063) (0.523) Constant 0.428*** 1.020*** 0.564*** 0.619*** 0.390*** 1.100***  (0.038) (0.282) (0.098) (0.110) (0.041) (0.342) Observations 1,657 1,657 320 320 1,337 1,337 R2 0.104 0.011 0.227 0.204 0.089 0.011 Adjusted R2 0.097 0.004 0.199 0.176 0.081 0.002 Residual Std. Error 0.268  (df = 1643) 1.966  (df = 1643) 0.284  (df = 308) 0.317  (df = 308) 0.262  (df = 1324) 2.183  (df = 1324) 
F Statistic 14.666
***  (df = 13; 1643) 
1.461  (df = 13; 1643) 
8.219***  (df = 11; 308) 
7.177***  (df = 11; 308) 
10.763*** (df = 12; 1324) 
1.278  (df = 12; 1324)   Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
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Appendix D Effects of industry characteristics on premiums paid by different acquirer types (med)   The sample includes 882 U.S. domestic all-cash acquisitions announced between 2000 and 2015 obtained from the SDC database. This table presents results from multiple linear regressions, where premium is the dependent variable, and industry characteristics are independent variables. There are also seven target company and deal related control variables. Results show coefficients for independent variables and standard errors in the brackets. First two regressions are linear regressions driven on the whole sample. Regressions (3) and (4) are for financial acquisitions. Regressions (5) and (6) are for strategic acquisitions. Industry-ratios are calculated from industry medians. 
 CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day CAR5 Premium 1day  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Financial Acquiror -0.049** -0.070***      (0.023) (0.024)     R&D 0.039 0.190 -0.403 -0.356 0.224 0.442  (0.350) (0.374) (0.636) (0.707) (0.415) (0.438) ROE -0.152 -0.133 0.481 0.551 -0.260 -0.239  (0.202) (0.216) (0.415) (0.461) (0.229) (0.242) Leverage -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.033** -0.041*** -0.011* -0.017***  (0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) CAGR 0.641** 0.607* -0.385 -0.200 0.832** 0.701**  (0.291) (0.311) (0.626) (0.695) (0.325) (0.343) Market-to-Book -0.023 -0.043** 0.026 -0.003 -0.038* -0.056**  (0.018) (0.019) (0.034) (0.038) (0.021) (0.022) lnMVEComp -0.037*** -0.041*** -0.081*** -0.075*** -0.021*** -0.030***  (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.009) TobinsQComp -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.001 -0.007 0.001  (0.010) (0.010) (0.026) (0.029) (0.011) (0.011) ROAComp -0.081** -0.066* -0.317*** -0.372*** -0.049 -0.009  (0.036) (0.039) (0.096) (0.107) (0.042) (0.044) Tender 0.069*** 0.034 0.108** 0.041 0.049* 0.025  (0.024) (0.026) (0.050) (0.056) (0.027) (0.028) TTermFee 0.055* 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.049 0.036  (0.030) (0.032) (0.053) (0.059) (0.035) (0.037) ALockup -0.116 -0.251*   -0.099 -0.228*  (0.124) (0.133)   (0.122) (0.129)        DebtAssetsComp 0.018 0.053 0.040 0.045 0.026 0.083*  (0.039) (0.042) (0.077) (0.086) (0.047) (0.049) Constant 0.512*** 0.623*** 0.638*** 0.702*** 0.433*** 0.553***  (0.062) (0.066) (0.120) (0.133) (0.071) (0.075) Observations 882 882 256 256 626 626 R2 0.104 0.100 0.252 0.211 0.072 0.074 Adjusted R2 0.091 0.087 0.219 0.175 0.054 0.056 Residual Std. Error 0.297  (df = 868) 0.318 (df = 868) 0.301 (df = 244) 0.335  (df = 244) 0.290  (df = 613) 0.306 (df = 613) 
F Statistic 7.764
*** (df = 13; 868) 
7.437*** (df = 13; 868) 
7.485*** (df = 11; 244) 
5.915***  (df = 11; 244) 
3.978***  (df = 12; 613) 
4.089***  (df = 12; 613) Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01   
